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a r t i c l e

i n f o

a b s t r a c t
When Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in August 2005, it greatly disrupted both the physical and social
structures of that community. One consequence of the hurricane was the displacement of large numbers of
New Orleans residents to other cities, including Houston, San Antonio, and Phoenix. There has been media
speculation that such a grand-scale population displacement led to increased crime in communities that
were recipient of large numbers of displaced New Orleans residents. This study was a case study of three
cities with somewhat different experiences with Katrina's diaspora. Time series analysis was used to
examine the pre- and post-Katrina trends in six Part I offenses (murder, robbery, aggravated assault, rape,
burglary, and auto theft) to assess any impact of such large-scale population shifts on crime in host
communities. Contrary to much popular speculation, only modest effects were found on crime. Social
disorganization theory was used to frame both the analysis and the interpretation of these results.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction
The devastation and destruction Hurricane Katrina inﬂicted upon
New Orleans and the Gulf Coast is well documented in media accounts,
government reports, and scientiﬁc inquiry. Much of this discussion
focused on Katrina's effects on the social fabric and physical environment of affected communities, as well as those communities that
received Katrina's diaspora. Media accounts (see Campo-Flores, 2006;
Cooper, 2006) highlighted changing crime patterns in the communities
that received the largest inﬂux of residents forced to ﬂee the Gulf Coast
region. Commentators initially made little mention of the possible
negative consequences associated with Katrina's diaspora. Later, serious
concerns emerged about problems such as crime in the months
following this disaster and displacement. Local policymakers largely
explained sharp increases in crime in the latter part of 2005 and into
2006 as resulting from the infusion of large numbers of displaced
persons from the Gulf region (i.e., Bustillo, 2006), many of whom were
from the most economically disadvantaged segments of society.
Public conjecture that survivors may have actually “brought crime”
to host communities played on some of society's worst features.
Questions of race and social class were introduced into this discourse
as a large percentage of persons displaced by Katrina were people of
color and/or economically distressed. Consequently, commentary on
the presumed negative effects of Katrina's population displacement
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was often highly polarizing. The tone of this debate was well reﬂected
in two postings to CNN's Anderson Cooper's on-line blog about the
effects of Katrina on Houston's crime. One blogger wrote:
Well, I live here, yes Houston. And we do feel the increase in our
crime. When you wake up and almost everyday there is either
[sic] another shooting, robbery, or apartment ﬁre. It always has a
[n] evacuee angle to it. Granted, not all are bad – some our [sic]
my neighbors and they are nice people. But, overall they are just
having a huge problem with ‘ﬁtting in.’ Part of me see's their
issues, but overall Houston is not a welfare town. We all work
hard and don't ask for much. I see hard working people from
Mexico that never complain [sic] - and they are highly respected
here. All we ask is - ﬁnd a home, ﬁnd a job (plenty around here)
and get on with your life. Gangs and turf wars don't ﬂy here. Also,
Texans carry guns - they shoot back! (Cooper, 2006)
Another blogger argued that any suggestion that evacuees were
responsible for increases in crime was irresponsible and merely out of
convenience. She wrote:
Why is it, when something like Katrina happens, the so called
‘host com[m]unties’ blame all of their crime and other social
issues on the people who they offered help to? Get real, the issues
in your communities were there way before this, you ignored
them and now you have scape[g]oats to blame it on. I hope what
has happened to them, never comes to your doorstep, but if it
does, remember your words to the current victims. Shame on
you!!! (Cooper, 2006)

S.P. Varano et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 42–50

Taken together the comments spoke to the tone of the arguments about Katrina's effects that took place in public and private
conversations.
The effort to disentangle Katrina-related effects on crime proved
difﬁcult. While there was plausible evidence that Katrina survivors
were implicated in the growing crime problem in communities like
Houston (Moreno, 2006), early published analyses did not sufﬁciently
address rival explanations. These accounts tended to simply compare
ﬂuctuation in Houston's crime rate with comparable time periods
before August 2005, when Katrina struck (see Cooper, 2006). These
over-simplistic accounts failed to adequately consider if post-Katrina
crime trends were part of longer trends already in place or whether
the trends were the direct result of this tragic event. Moreover,
existing media accounts did not consider how Houston's experiences
in the aftermath of Katrina corresponded to those of other
communities that also received sizable numbers of displaced persons.
Thus, it was difﬁcult to differentiate the effects of Katrina on crime
with the existing level and quality of analysis that had been provided.
This article examines crime rate trends in Houston, San Antonio,
and Phoenix during a 143-week period encompassing Katrina's
landfall. More speciﬁcally, the study examined how crime trends in
the period preceding Hurricane Katrina differed from those after the
event. The analysis sought to understand how or if this disaster
inﬂuenced crime rates, particularly within the communities receiving
an appreciable proportion of the residents forced from New Orleans
and other Gulf Coast communities. This study was not intended to be
an analysis of crime trends in New Orleans or the surrounding area in
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, nor was it intended to be
considered an exhaustive study of national or even regional crime
effects of Katrina. Instead, this study sought to understand the impact
of Hurricane Katrina on crime in three cities that received sizable
numbers of displaced persons. In the aftermath of Katrina and the
related inﬂux of residents, all three communities began to explain
away crime increases as something other than locally grown. Katrina
survivors, in many ways, became the scapegoats for crime increases.
The analysis examined crime data using time-series statistics and
used social disorganization theory and other theoretical perspectives
on the sociology of disasters to place ﬁndings into perspective.
Destruction and displacement: the effects of Hurricane Katrina
Clear accounts of when and where Hurricane Katrina's displaced
populations went from the affected areas remain a challenge for
scholars and government ofﬁcials.1 In the month after Katrina's landfall,
the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) processed
some 1.36 million requests for assistance (“Storm and Crisis,” 2005).
Several proximate urban centers responded to this human tragedy by
hosting large numbers of displaced residents. Houston was the largest
receiving point outside of the state of Louisiana, accepting some 240,000
persons in the week following Katrina's landfall.2 Other cities such as
San Antonio, Texas and Phoenix, Arizona also agreed to provide support
to Katrina's victims, although receiving smaller yet still substantial
numbers of displaced persons.3 The impact of evacuees on the local
infrastructure was felt almost immediately, testing the capacity of local
institutions such as schools, hospitals, social welfare organizations,
communications, and other local infrastructure to handle the rapid and
large-scale population increase (“Storm and Crisis,” 2005). Population
growth is typically a slow-moving statistic, cast often in years and
decades. This single event, Katrina, shifted populations rapidly,
condensing the effects of such changes for the receiving communities
in profound ways.
A review of news accounts in the weeks following Katrina revealed
that host communities quickly began to experience signiﬁcant challenges accommodating these sudden population increases. Miller's
(2007) case study of Huntsville's (Texas) difﬁculties absorbing a
nearly 50 percent increase in population associated with Hurricanes
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Katrina and Rita are noteworthy. Problems associated with day-today functions like laundry and bathing facilities proved to be substantial. It is also important to consider that many of the evacuees
were among the most economically disadvantaged, arriving with few
if any resources or connection to family or friends that could offer
ﬁnancial support. A large proportion of the evacuees were highly
dependent on the government, local charities, and generous private
citizens to provide for their most basic needs including food, clothing,
and shelter. In many cases, the need was both immediate and longerterm in scope. Coping immediately with such a disadvantaged
population surge, as well as planning for what clearly became an
expectation of a long-term time horizon for restoring the damage of
Katrina, posed many problems for the receiving communities. In
places like Phoenix, for example, local reports suggested that the
inﬂux of Katrina evacuees created acute housing shortages among the
local needy (Magahern, 2005).
The effects of Hurricane Katrina on its survivors, especially some of
the most ill-prepared and economically disadvantaged, can be difﬁcult
to comprehend.4 It is likely that many survivors were confused,
disoriented, and often separated from immediate family members,
loved ones, and social support networks (see Morrow, 1997; Shaw &
Shaw, 2004). Net of all of these problems was a population that was
scared and confused, lacked routine knowledge of the areas in which
they now found themselves, was separated from customary social
support networks, and had limited and often marginal economic
support. As evidenced by the aftermath of other disasters (see Bates &
Peacock, 2008; Dash, Peacock, & Morrow, 1997), coming to terms with
Katrina's devastation was nearly impossible for most, but especially for
the poorest of the poor.
Literature review
Scholars have been drawn to the study of disaster because such
incidents are sociological microcosms—laboratories for testing social
and psychological theories relating to individual and collective
behavior (Barton, 1969; Drabek, 1986; Lanza-Kaduce, Dunham,
Akers, & Cromwell, 1998). Disasters by their very nature affect the
level of order in an area providing researchers the opportunity to
study the type(s) and level(s) of disruption, as well as how order is
reestablished over time (Sweet, 1998). Though incidents of disaster
naturally pique scholarly curiosity, conducting rigorous analyses of
how disasters inﬂuence social structures and social processes has
been a more difﬁcult enterprise. Though quasi-experimental designs
can be employed, the unplanned nature of disasters usually resulted in
pre-/post-incident data of insufﬁcient quality; researchers often relied
on nonequivalent samples, readily available data, and recollectionbased data gathered after an incident occurred (e.g., Adams & Adams,
1984; Aguirre, 1980; Bates, Fogleman, Parenton, Pittman, & Tracy, 1963;
Palinkas, Downs, Petterson, & Russell, 1993; Shore, Tatum, & Vollmer,
1986; Sweet, 1998). Despite these limitations, research into the social
effects of disasters has provided insight into the impact of such events on
routine life.
The human response to disaster
Regardless of their speciﬁc origin (climatic event, terrorist attack,
industrial accident, and the like), disasters and critical incidents tend
to exude some level of disruptive inﬂuence. Individuals affected by
disaster may experience disruptions in their family and community
life, interruptions in their occupational status, damage or destruction
of housing, loss of ﬁnancial status and stability, and challenges to
accessing everyday consumer, health, and government services.
Entire communities can experience comparable effects, with the
additional loss of family members and friends due to injury, death, or
displacement (Ursano, McCaughey, & Fullerton, 1994). Damage in
some situations has been so extensive that it resulted in “collective
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stress” whereby the demand placed on a system exceeded its
response capacity (Barton, 1969). Within this milieu, a variety of
individual, community, and victim characteristics (some preexisting,
others emerging in the aftermath of an incident) inﬂuenced the
collective responses to disasters (Barton, 1969; Bolin, 1985; Drabek,
1986; Dynes & Quarantelli, 1980; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977).
Quarantelli and Dynes (1977), for example, explained that the response
of groups to disasters is understood very much in the context of preevent “readiness.”
The precise social impact of disasters remained somewhat unclear;
some research suggested disasters have a destructive effect on the
social fabric thereby causing “anomic” conditions such as looting (see
Drabek, 2007; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1970; Tierney, 2007). Other
theoretical frameworks suggested quite the opposite, where such
events had a cohesive effect that drew communities together (see
Miller, 2007; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1970, 1977). Looting, for example,
may be conceptualized normative response by other law-abiding
citizens in response to breakdowns in social order (see Quarantelli &
Dynes, 1970). In contrast, the September 11, 2001 attacks in New
York, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania served as evidence that
individuals and communities could experience social cohesion after
major disasters (Neria, Gross, & Marshall, 2006). Residents from
affected areas experience a sense of solidarity through surviving the
disaster, seeking to rebuild and reclaim their community, showing
their unity in the face of adversity, and demonstrating their individual and collective resilience and strength (Bates & Peacock, 1987;
Miller, 2007; Morrow & Peacock, 1997; Siegel, Bourque, & Shoaf,
1999; Turner, 1967). Disaster can bring citizens together, enhancing
community cohesion (Drabek, 1986; Friesema, Caporaso, Goldstein,
Lineberry, & McCleary, 1979), goodwill, unity, and altruistic concerns
for one's neighbors and community. Citing the overwhelming
evidence of benevolence and good will that often follow disasters,
scholars largely rejected the “anomie” argument (Quarantelli & Dynes,
1970).5
Disasters and their aftermath often interrupt normal social
networks and communal relations. Even when citizens do not lose
access to their normal support systems, disasters often created
excessive demand on such systems (Barton, 1969; Siegel et al.,
1999). Individuals have experienced a range of negative psychological
effects due not only to the incident (Fullerton, Ursano, & Norwood,
2004; Shaw & Shaw, 2004), but the aftermath of the incident and the
process of negotiating what are often complex processes designed to
provide help and restore normalcy. In fact, Weems et al. (2007) found
that not only did Katrina have a substantial psychological impact on
many survivors, but the degree of the impact was mitigated by local
“context” including the quality of support systems and preexisting
levels of racial discrimination. Findings also suggested the destructive
effects of disasters were particularly problematic in areas already
suffering from weak social bonds, such as economic and socially
disadvantaged neighborhoods (Genevie et al., 1987; Siegel et al., 1999).
Thus, consistent with the suggestions of a long line of researchers
(Barton, 1969; Bolin, 1985; Miller, 2007; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977),
pre-disaster conditions explained much of the post-disaster responses.
The duration of destructive elements (temporary or long-term) is
dependent on the nature of the disaster, the capacity of local
infrastructure to provide assistance, and the quality of the social support
systems on which victims must rely. With time, affected citizens and
communities should acclimate to and cope with their circumstances,
overcoming the damage wrought by disaster; in effect, the social
destruction created by disaster may follow a decay curve (Drabek, 1986)
though some permanent change may persist.
Disasters and crime: prior research
The study of the impact of disasters focused on a range of
economic, social, and psychological effects, including considerations

of how disasters affected levels of crime (speciﬁc types or in general)
and disorder. Though researchers have examined the disaster-crime
nexus for a number of decades, results have not been conclusive.
Differences in crime rates were not witnessed after the Northridge
(California) earthquake in 1995 (Siegel et al., 1999), the Quebec ice
storm of 1998 (Lemieux, 1998), the New York City blackout of 1965
(Blackout History Project, 1965), or the Detroit blackout of 2003
(Hansen, 2003). In contrast, higher crime rates were found in the
aftermath of the New York City blackouts of 1977 (Genevie et al., 1987)
and 2003 (“Wasn't So Calm,” 2003), Hurricanes Andrew (Cromwell,
Dunham, Akers, & Lanza-Kaduce, 1995) and Hugo (LeBeau, 2002), and
other disasters (Adams & Adams, 1984; Fothergill, 1996; Friesema et al.,
1979). In reality, the effects of disasters on crime and disorder may have
been one of both consensus and conﬂict. Tierney (2007), for example,
drew on historical accounts of disasters and found that accounts of
heroic behavior and altruism masked instances of violence that was
oftentimes against lower-class communities.
As suggested by Tierney (2007), the relationship between
disasters and disorder was much more nuanced than it ﬁrst appeared.
Considerations of crime across an urban area, for example, might
actually have missed variation across neighborhoods and types of
crime. For example, the 1977 New York City blackout resulted in
pockets of arson, looting, and violence (Blackout History Project,
1977; Curvin & Porter, 1979; Genevie et al., 1987). While the New
York City blackout of 2003 did not seem to inﬂuence the crime rate
and while the raw number of arrests made was slightly below the
norm for a summer night, the number of reported burglaries was
double the number recorded on the same day the previous year
(“Wasn't So Calm,” 2003). Depending on the nature of a disaster,
crime rates may initially decline as citizens (even “career” offenders)
seek shelter and must “dig out” of the damaged area; personal shelter
and survival needs may trump criminal motivations (Cromwell et al.,
1995). The type of offending may also change as time progresses after
an incident; opportunistic property crimes might give way to fraud,
scams, and price gouging of a vulnerable population (Cromwell et al.,
1995). In this vein, LeBeau (2002) found short-term increases in
domestic violence, burglary, and “man with a gun” calls in Charlotte,
North Carolina, after Hurricane Hugo, though these increases were
relatively short in duration.
The majority of research studying the disaster-crime relationship
failed to consider the possible inﬂuence a disaster might have had
outside of the affected zone (Fradkin, 2005). While not relevant in all
types of disasters, such consideration is germane where disasters
result in a mass out-migration of affected citizens. The large numbers
of citizens displaced by Hurricane Katrina raised questions of whether
and how crime rates changed in communities receiving those
displaced residents. Even with the inﬂux of additional government
personnel to provide for displaced residents, Houston experienced an
increase in targets suitable for some offenses, an inﬂux of persons who
might have become motivated to offend, and a relative decline in the
presence of informal capable guardianship (see Decker, Varano, &
Greene, 2007). Those who served the latter function in their former
neighborhood might have been less inclined to serve that role in a
new area, presuming they were even proximate to former neighbors.
Capable guardians native to Houston were dealing with an unfamiliar
population and disrupted routines (i.e., tasked to serve that role
outside of routine locations or assignments) making the maintenance
of social control even more difﬁcult.
Methodology
The purpose of the current research was to determine the effects of
Hurricane Katrina on crime in communities that received large
numbers of displaced residents. The following section presents a
series of analyses testing for Katrina-related effects in three host
communities in the twelve months following the event. This analysis
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built on media accounts that the inﬂux of Katrina survivors to
communities like Houston resulted in a substantial increase in serious
crime. The analysis compared crime trends for the city of Houston to
two comparison cities, San Antonio, Texas and Phoenix, Arizona using
both bivariate (pre-post Katrina) and time series analyses.
Research setting
Houston, San Antonio, and Phoenix represented a cross-section of
cities that received evacuees in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
Estimates indicated that Houston initially received some 240,000
affected citizens, with approximately 150,000 staying well into 2006
(Bustillo, 2006; O'Hare, 2007), an approximate 7 percent increase in
that city's 2000 population (www.census.gov). This inﬂux placed
Houston at the top of “host communities” in terms of number of
persons accepted. Other estimates suggested that approximately
30,000 displaced persons relocated to San Antonio (Bensman, 2006),
an increase of nearly 3 percent in 2000 population (www.census.gov).
In contrast to Houston, reports suggested that a large proportion of
evacuees stayed in San Antonio for a shorter period of times and left
for other destinations within a few months of their arrival. Finally,
estimates suggested that Phoenix hosted approximately 6,000
evacuees, many of who were thought to have stayed (Reckdahl,
2006). This increase represented less than one-half of 1 percent
increase over the 2000 population (www.census.gov).
Houston, San Antonio, and Phoenix represented important
comparison locations for several reasons. First, all three cities share
regional characteristics that provide a degree of cross-community
comparability. All three communities received appreciable numbers
of evacuees from Hurricane Katrina; each experienced near simultaneous increases in concern about crime and the capacity of local
human/social service systems to address the needs of evacuees. All
three communities also experienced an increase in serious violent
crime pursuant to the inﬂux of evacuees, increases that were directly
or indirectly linked to Katrina evacuees. Most notable in both Houston
(Leahy & Villafranca, 2006; O'Hare, 2006) and San Antonio (Bensman,
2006), local law enforcement ofﬁcials and the media alike perpetuated the image that crime increases in the latter half of 2005 and into
2006 were attributable to Katrina evacuees. Houston, San Antonio,
and Phoenix represented three communities with somewhat different
experiences responding to the Katrina diaspora. The purpose of this
research was to provide a case study of three similar but different
communities that received a notable number of displaced persons
and experienced crime-related concerns in the following weeks and
months.
Data and measures
The data used for this study came from crime data supplied by the
police departments in each of the study locations. For purposes of the
study, the analysis was restricted to homicide, rape, robbery,
aggravated assault, auto theft, and burglary; these offenses were
conventionally considered to be among the most serious crimes and
had generated public concern in the host communities. It is important
to note these data represented ofﬁcial crimes known to and reported
by the police. The Phoenix Police Department provided weekly crime
counts for each Uniform Crime Report (UCR) Part I crime class for the
period January 2004 through September 2006. Crime data for Houston
were downloaded directly from a publicly available Web site that lists
incident-level crime data for each neighborhood (police beat) in the
city of Houston (http://www.houstontx.gov/police/stats2.htm). These
data were downloaded and aggregated to weekly counts covering the
period January 2004 through September 2006. The San Antonio Police
Department's Crime Analysis Unit provided data for the city of San
Antonio. Data were provided for each recorded criminal event in San
Antonio for the study period. Like Phoenix and Houston, the data were
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aggregated to weekly counts for each Part I UCR violent crime
category covering the period January 2004 through September 2006.
Each city's weekly counts were ﬁrst transformed to rates per 100,0006
for the six dependent variables (crime types) and then ultimately
transformed again to standardized z-scores. The z-scores allowed for
the comparison of crime levels across cities that experienced different
base rates of crime. With a mean of zero, z-scores represented
deviations from the mean, which were expressed in standardized
increments.
Analysis
To test for apparent Hurricane Katrina effects on the serious crime,
143 observation points were included in the analysis for each
jurisdiction that measured standardized weekly crime totals. The
main force of Hurricane Katrina hit Southwest Louisiana during
the morning of August 29, 2005 and lasted approximately two days.
The week starting September 5, 2005 was used to demarcate the
“intervention” point or the time when the effects of the large number
of displaced residents resulting from Hurricane Katrina should begin
to be realized if indeed any existed. The time series data set included
eighty-seven pre-intervention and ﬁfty-six post-intervention7 observation periods.
Bivariate analysis
Pre- and post-Katrina descriptive statistics as well as bivariate
analysis are presented in Table 1. Included in Table 1 are standardized
crime counts (z-scores) and crime rates (per 100,000) that were
computed for the time periods before and after Katrina. Z-scores were
computed to allow for comparison of different crime levels over time,
which is especially useful for crimes with low base rates. This analysis
presents within-city data, as a foundation to describing crime patterns
over time.
Average weekly crime rates were included in Table 1 for each of
the three study locations. These ﬁgures allowed for a general
comparison of crime levels between cities.8 Among the most
noteworthy ﬁndings, Phoenix experienced the highest levels of
murder and auto theft both before and after Katrina. The auto theft
rate was nearly three times San Antonio's rate and nearly twice that of
Houston. Houston, in contrast, experienced the highest levels of
robbery and aggravated assault. Finally, with the exception of
burglary, San Antonio's weekly crime rates were the lowest of the
three sites.
Bivariate comparisons of average weekly crime totals are also
presented in Table 1 for the three locations. The data presented
indicated that all three communities experienced signiﬁcant postKatrina increases in several forms of serious crime. Houston, for
example, experienced signiﬁcant (p b .05) increases in murder,
robbery, and auto theft. Phoenix also experienced signiﬁcant increases
in robbery and aggravated assault; San Antonio experienced significant increases in robbery and auto theft. There were signiﬁcant decreases in burglary in Phoenix and rape in San Antonio after Katrina.
The data presented in Table 1 provided initial support for the
conclusion that there was a signiﬁcant increase across a crosssection of crime types in communities that received large numbers
of displaced persons in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. With a
few exceptions, the changes were in the positive direction, meaning
that there was more crime experienced in the post-Katrina period.
While these initial ﬁndings were important, the analysis of weekly
trends did not adequately parse out if changes in crime that were
related to the inﬂux of Katrina survivors or merely part of a preexisting trend.
Many communities across the United States, including those not
directly affected by Katrina-related population shifts, also reported
increases in violent crime between 2004 and 2006. A recent report by
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Table 1
Pre-post intervention weekly totals; standardized z-scores and rates per 100,000 (included in parentheses)a, b, c
Crime type

Pre-Katrina (n = 87)
Mean

Post-Katrina (n = 56)
S.D.

Total series (n = 143)

Mean

S.D.

Mean

Houston

Murder*
Robbery*
Rape
Agg. assault
Burglary
Auto theft*

-0.17
-0.26
0.07
0.16
-0.03
-0.11

(0.23)
(7.98)
(0.66)
(9.62)
(20.78)
(16.33)

0.89
0.99
1.06
1.02
0.42
0.94

(0.11)
(1.07)
(0.19)
(1.26)
(1.45)
(1.64)

0.35 (0.29)
0.42 (8.72)
-0.02 (0.64)
-0.12 (9.28)
0.06 (21.10)
0.30 (17.05)

1.06
0.92
0.91
0.93
1.55
0.96

(0.13)
(1.00)
(0.16)
(1.15)
(5.38)
(1.68)

Phoenix

Murder
Robbery*
Rape
Agg. assault*
Burglary*
Auto theft*

-0.14
-0.03
-0.13
-0.11
0.00
0.03

(0.31)
(5.73)
(0.69)
(7.87)
(23.80)
(36.18)

0.98
0.97
0.88
1.00
0.96
0.96

(0.17)
(0.88)
(0.25)
(0.21)
(1.87)
(2.80)

0.15 (0.36)
0.51 (6.21)
0.10 (0.74)
0.38 (8.54)
-0.48 (22.86)
-0.43 (34.86)

1.00
0.99
1.06
0.86
0.93
0.91

(0.17)
(0.88)
(0.25)
(1.18)
(1.80)
(2.65)

San Antonio

Murder
Robbery*
Rape*
Agg. assault
Burglary
Auto theft*

-0.07
-0.22
0.14
0.13
-0.18
-0.22

(0.14)
(3.86)
(2.92)
(3.49)
(25.11)
(11.55)

0.97 (0.12)
0.97 (0.98)
0.93 (0.63)
1.05 (1.69)
1.05 (3.33)
0.98 (1.69)

0.11 (0.16)
0.34 (4.42)
-0.22 (2.69)
-0.19 (3.34)
0.13 (25.79)
0.35 (12.53)

1.05
0.96
1.08
0.89
0.91
0.95

(0.13)
(0.97)
(0.73)
(0.76)
(2.89)
(12.53)

a
b
c

0.03
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.01
0.05

S.D.
(0.26)
(8.27)
(0.65)
(9.49)
(20.91)
(16.61)

0.99
1.02
1.00
0.99
1.02
0.96

(0.12)
(1.10)
(0.18)
(1.22)
(3.54)
(1.69)

-0.02 (0.33)
0.18 (5.92)
-0.04 (0.71)
0.08 (8.13)
-0.19 (23.43)
-0.15 (35.66)

1.00
1.01
0.96
1.01
0.97
0.96

(0.17)
(0.90)
(0.23)
(1.38)
(1.89)
(2.81)

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

(0.12)
(1.01)
(0.68)
(0.76)
(3.17)
(1.73)

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

(0.15)
(4.08)
(2.83)
(3.43)
(25.37)
(11.93)

Mean comparisons calculations based on z-scores: ⁎ p b .05 for pre-post comparison.
Crime rates included in parentheses.
Crime rates based on 2000 census populations; Katrina diaspora confounds base rate.

the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) (2007), for example, noted
sharp increases in aggravated assaults with ﬁrearms in many communities across the United States during this same period. Communities
such as Arlington, Texas; Baltimore County, Maryland; and Detroit,
Michigan experienced increases of more than 30 percent in robbery
during the same period. These increases led PERF (2007, p. 2) to warn of
a “gathering storm” of violent crime. Thus, it was necessary to conduct
more sophisticated analysis of the data series before concluding that the
crime increases noted above were independently associated with the
Katrina disaster.

Interrupted time series analysis
Interrupted time series analysis was used to further test the effects
of Katrina on crime levels in the three study locations that received
substantial numbers of displaced persons. ARIMA models are effective
for controlling for time-dependent components common to sequentially ordered data sets. Several problems commonly associated with
time series data such as seasonality and time-dependency violate the
assumptions of OLS regression and require appropriate statistical
techniques to control for their potential inﬂuences (see Box & Jenkins,
1976; Box & Tiao, 1975). Autocorrelation, for example, exists when the
error corresponding to observations are correlated with other points in
the same series. This creates serial dependency in the data. The
“interrupted” time series design is a speciﬁc type of ARIMA technique
that allows for the inclusion of a temporary or sustained “intervention”
(McDowall, McCleary, Meidinger, & Hay, 1980). The technique allows
for the comparison of pre- and post-intervention trends after
controlling for time-dependency.
There are three structural parameters to ARIMA models that must be
diagnosed and modeled to ﬁnd the appropriate “ﬁt” for the data:
autoregressive (p), difference (d), and moving average (q) (McDowall
et al., 1980). The autoregressive component is the relationship between
an observation and the kth preceding values. The ﬁrst order process
(ARIMA(1,p,d)) is among the most common autoregressive function
(McDowall et al., 1980, p. 32). The moving average component accounts
for levels of stationarity in the series or the degree to which the series
demonstrates shifting patterns of serial correlation. In this case the
series must be differenced. Finally, the moving average is similar to the

autoregressive parameter with the exception that it models error that is
not captured in the autoregressive term.9
The estimated ARIMA models for Houston's crime data are presented
in Table 2 for each of the six crime categories. The estimated ARIMA
parameters are included in the crime-speciﬁc column headings. For
example, diagnostics of the murder data series indicated a signiﬁcant
autoregressive parameter but no concerns with differencing or moving
averages. Thus, the model for murder was ARIMA (1, 0, 0) where the “1”
indicated a ﬁrst order autoregressive component.10
The variable labeled “post-Katrina” represented the intervention
effect of the inﬂux of displaced persons. Looking across the models, the
ﬁndings suggested that there were signiﬁcant increases in weekly levels
of murder and robbery after the occurrence of Katrina after controlling
for preexisting trends in the data in Houston. The data, however, also
indicated these observed increases were not uniform across all crime
types but speciﬁc to murder and robbery. The coefﬁcients for rape and
aggravated assault, although nonsigniﬁcant, were in the negative
direction. The increases in violence were then not consistent across all
types of assaultive violence. These ﬁndings were generally consistent
with the ﬁndings in Table 1. The ﬁndings also indicated that there was
no signiﬁcant change in auto theft levels after controlling for seasonal
and nonseasonal moving averages and auto-regression.
The ﬁndings for Phoenix and San Antonio are presented in Tables 3
and 4 respectively. Like the previous models, the parameter estimates
are included in the column labels. Looking across the Phoenix models,
the post-Katrina intervention effect was signiﬁcant for only one
model, murder. This supported the conclusion that Phoenix's
homicide levels were signiﬁcantly higher after Hurricane Katrina
controlling for the time-dependency in the data. The intervention
effect was not statistically signiﬁcant for the post-Katrina period for
any of the other crime types. The preliminary ﬁnding in Table 1
indicating a signiﬁcant increase in robbery, aggravated assault,
burglary, and auto theft in the wake of Katrina no longer remained
after controlling for preexisting trends in Phoenix. The San Antonio
models presented in Table 4 indicated the effects of Katrina were not
signiﬁcant for any of the crime types. Although the bivariate ﬁndings
in Table 1 indicated signiﬁcant increases in robbery, rape, and auto
theft, the effects were no longer signiﬁcant after controlling for timedependency. Thus, none of the pre- and post-Katrina weekly crime
levels was signiﬁcantly different in San Antonio, only homicide was
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Table 2
Time series analysis, Houston, Texas

Autoregressive function
Moving average
Post-Katrina
Constant

Murder (1,0,0)

Robbery (1,0,0)

Rape (1,0,0)

b

SE

b

SE

b

-0.08
-0.35**
--

-3.68
0.17
--

0.34***
-0.66**
-0.25

0.08
-0.23
-0.15

-0.16*
--0.09
0.07

Aggravated
assault (0,1,1)

Burglary (0,0,2)

Auto theft (1,0,1)

SE

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

0.08
-0.15
0.09

-0.77**
-0.67
0.01

-0.06
0.62
-0.00

--0.11
-0.09
-0.03

-0.09
0.20
0.13

0.82**
0.46*
0.46
-0.12

0.08
0.13
0.38
0.38

⁎p b .05.
⁎⁎p b .01.
⁎⁎⁎p b .001.

different in Phoenix, and homicide and robbery in Houston. Overall,
the contention that displaced persons signiﬁcantly altered a city's
crime problem found limited support in this analysis.
The analyses suggested that net of other trends already underway
in Houston, Phoenix, and San Antonio, rises in certain types of serious
crime could not be directly and independently associated with
Hurricane Katrina. The timing of the displaced New Orleans
population that ended up in these host cities did not correspond to
the observed changes. On the other hand, murder and robbery did
increase in Houston in the post-Katrina period, and Houston was the
city that received the most of Katrina's victims. Moreover, in Phoenix,
the city with the smallest inﬂux of post-Katrina evacuees, murder
rates were also affected, while no changes in serious crime rates
occurred in San Antonio, where the absorbed post-Katrina population
was proportionately the second largest of the three cities studied.
So it was clear that the rapid inﬂux of population in some of the
cities receiving Katrina evacuees had some affect on certain crimes,
most particularly murder, followed by robbery. Equally important,
however, was the absence of change in other serious crime types
including other personally violent crime (assault and rape), and
property offending (burglary, auto theft, and arson), crimes where
economic motivation may be said to have been the most visible in the
case of the displacement of so many people.
Discussion
Large-scale disasters like Hurricane Katrina, similar to other types of
planned (protests, cultural events, sporting events, etc.) or unplanned
(terrorist acts) events, have the ability to create social conditions that
result in an increase in disorder. Such events often result not only in the
destruction of physical space and infrastructure, but may also result in
the destruction or displacement of formal and informal mechanisms of
social control that help in the recovery and regulate/control behavior in
the process. Hurricane Katrina was a uniquely devastating event
because the destruction was so complete and covered such a large
region that recovery efforts have proven difﬁcult. In the end, Hurricane
Katrina represented a unique type of event in that it resulted in an
extraordinarily large diaspora scattered across the country with few
cultural or social connections assisting recovery.

The large-scale diaspora associated with Katrina was also quite
different from other disasters in that it affected communities across the
country not directly harmed by the original storm. That is, communities
across the country were faced with substantial challenges associated
with absorbing large numbers of displaced persons. Cities like Houston,
for example, experienced nearly a 10 percent population increase
almost overnight. The natural challenges were only exacerbated by the
extreme ﬁnancial needs, and physical and mental health problems
associated with the displaced population. The human service and public
safety sectors of many host communities were overwhelmed by the
sudden and sustained nature of the resulting population shifts.
Taken together, the “mixed ﬁndings” presented here suggested
that Katrina did have some effect on serious crime at least in two of
the three cities examined, but those effects were neither widespread
(across all crime categories), nor pervasive (across the three cities).
This suggested that local circumstances, coupled by the volume of
displaced persons being absorbed by any particular city play a role in
increasing crime, and that disaster planning and relief efforts should
be cognizant of issues of “over-saturation” in the capacity of receiving
communities to adequately adjust to such disasters. Equally important
was the idea that those displaced were not a criminogenic mob to be
“blamed” for crime increases. While this analysis looked at cities as
the frame of reference, displaced persons were not likely to be equally
distributed across these cities. Rather, they were likely to be situated
in neighborhoods and communities that themselves evidenced some
level of stress and social disorganization. Evacuation planners should
also be cognizant of the social and community dynamics of the places
that receive those displaced by disasters.
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, public planners are faced with
coming to grips with the short- and long-term affects of disasters.
Such considerations, however, should not be restricted merely to
locations directly effected by the storm, but those communities
helping with the recovering by hosting displaced persons. Developing
response protocols for large-scale events is a challenging process
given the complex mix of converging circumstances, situations, and
resources. Even where planning is possible and even where an event
is deﬁned as having been “successful,” lessons can still be learned
(Decker et al., 2005). Much of the focus on the Hurricane Katrina
response was appropriately centered on New Orleans and other

Table 3
Time series analysis, Phoenix, Arizona

Autoregressive function 1
Autoregressive function 2
Moving average
Post-Katrina
Constant
⁎p b .05.
⁎⁎p b .01.
⁎⁎⁎p b .001.

Murder (2,0,0)

Robbery (1,0,1)

Rape (1,0,0)

Aggravated
assault (1,1,1)

Burglary (0,1,1)

Auto theft (1,0,1)

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

-0.08
-0.18*
-0.29*
-0.14

0.08
0.08
-0.14
0.08

0.80***
-0.60**
-0.49
0.13

0.11
-0.16
0.32
0.21

-0.05
--0.23
-0.13

0.09
--0.16
0.10

-0.18
-0.70***
-0.19
0.01

0.11
-0.08
0.56
0.02

--0.78***
0.12
--

--0.05
0.56
--

0.88***
-0.61***
-0.45
0.17

0.06
-0.10
0.37
0.23
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Table 4
Time series analysis, San Antonio, Texas

Autoregressive function 1
Autoregressive function 2
Autoregressive function 3
Moving average
Post-Katrina
Constant

Murder (2,0,0)

Robbery (2,0,0)

Rape (3,0,0)

b

SE

b

SE

b

0.25*
0.13
---0.16
-0.06

0.08
0.08
--0.26
0.16

0.16
0.26
--0.48
-0.20

0.08
0.08
--0.26
0.17

0.23**
0.05
0.29**
--0.23
0.07

Aggravated
assault (2,0,0)

Burglary (0,1,1)

Auto theft (0,1,1)

SE

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

0.08
0.08
0.08
-0.33
0.20

0.25**
0.13
---0.16
0.06

0.08
0.08
--0.26
0.16

---0.69**
-0.12
--

---0.06
0.58
--

---0.72***
0.42
0.00

---0.06
0.57
0.02

⁎p b .05.
⁎⁎p b .01.
⁎⁎⁎p b .001.

affected areas. What should not be ignored, however, is the inﬂuence
large-scale events may have on other areas, particularly those
receiving displaced populations (Buerger, 2007).
Some parallels can be seen between the impact of receiving large
numbers of new residents from a disaster such as Katrina and hosting
large-scale planned events such as protests, conferences, or sporting
competitions (see Alpert & Flynn, 2000; Decker et al, 2005; Decker
et al., 2007). In both cases, local agencies must balance routine service
demands with those generated by the event or population inﬂux. A
key distinction, however, is that planned events typically provide an
inﬂux of additional public safety personnel and by deﬁnition, a
capacity for planned responses to support population shifts. The
parallels, however, are only limited. In the case of unplanned events
like large-scale disasters, sudden population shifts to communities
outside the area directly affected may not receive an inﬂux of
resources, especially those relating to public safety. Thus, public safety
resources are likely to remain relatively ﬁxed, while the absolute
numbers of individuals experiencing extraordinary economic and
social stressors may increase.
The current study was intended to provide a case study of the possible
effects of sudden and population shifts on crime in the wake of such an
event. Popular culture in communities across the country receiving
Katrina's diaspora speculated that there was a notable and sustained
increase in serious crime. The degree to which communities like Houston,
San Antonio, and Phoenix experienced a “spike” in crime in the months
that followed, local policymakers explained away the phenomenon as
imported with Katrina survivors. The data presented above indicated
there were signiﬁcant increases in homicide and robbery in some cases,
but such effects were not widespread. It is quite difﬁcult to disentangle
this complicated relationship. It seems safe, however, to conclude that the
Katrina-related diaspora did not correspond with a wide-scale dramatic
increase in crime. While any increase in serious forms of violence is
intolerable, the increases in crime in particular communities was likely
more modest than public opinion might suggest. In fact, if anything, the
current analyses were conservative estimations of crime changes since
they did not account for the week-to-week and month-to-month
population shifts that occurred in the aftermath of Katrina. From a public
policy perspective, it is important to disentangle the tendency to explain
away crime trends as imported and not locally grown, or as in this case,
part of longer trends. These fears may certainly inﬂuence the decisions of
other communities to assist in the future.
When one considers the likely outcomes associated with a
disaster, it is also important to understand the local context. In fact,
Weems et al. (2007) argued the psychological affects are mitigated by
such factors. In assessing the looting following the New York City
blackout of 1977, Genevie et al. (1987) noted that the existing
problems in a community provided a context for understanding
behavior. “The social problems, which relate to the quality of life in a
community, could be viewed as “push” factors, forces that worked to
increase the extent of looting. When unemployment, crime, fear and
underground economic activity were high, residents did not develop a

strong sense of attachment to the community and were more likely to
behave destructively when opportunities like the Blackout arise”
(Genevie et al., 1987, p. 229). In this case, Katrina was again unique in
that a good deal of the “human recovery” needed to occur in locations
to which victims had little or no connections. Implications for police
ofﬁcials were not limited to the immediate area of impact (Rojek &
Smith, 2007), but also extended into communities across the country.
Clearly, new residents in a community fail to share in that “sense of
attachment” that can enable them to more successfully resist the
criminal opportunities posed by a disaster or critical incident.
Social control in neighborhoods exists to ensure that residents can go
about their lives in relative safety. One challenge of informal social
control is that it seeks to enforce norms that are informally derived (see
Greenberg & Rohe, 1986). As a consequence, external challenges that
upset the informal patterns of social control should be expected to yield
higher crime rates. Contrary to the expectations derived from social
disorganization theory, the crime in Houston did not increase
signiﬁcantly in four of six categories. In Phoenix, only one of six crime
types, albeit murder, increased and in San Antonio, none of the six crime
types increased. These results suggested that there was an internal
capacity for control in communities to absorb disruptions in social
control created by the introduction of large numbers of displaced
residents into a community. The ﬁndings indicated that social control is
an elastic commodity, capable of expanding and adapting to the
challenges of mobility and change. This, however, should not lull
planners into a state of complacency, but instead encourage them to
consider moving “planning” beyond the immediate site of disasters and
consider responses that build strong communities.
Study limitations
There were several limitations to this study that should be taken in
consideration when evaluating the outcomes. First, this was not
intended to serve as an exhaustive study of the effects of Katrinarelated diaspora. Instead, it was intended to serve as a case study of
three similar communities and their experiences in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. Different from other studies on the topic, the intent
was to consider the broader impacts speciﬁc to crime experienced by
these host communities. Such a story, however, was extraordinarily
complex and could not be reduced to a time series of crime data. The
primary goal was to recommend a more cautious approach when
attempting to place wholesale blame on Katrina survivors for the
increases in crime in some host communities. In fact, only limited, but
notable, support was shown for Katrina-related effects. A more
exhaustive study would have to consider a broader cross-section of
communities, but also be able to control for certain features of the
displaced populations and local conditions of host communities that
play important roles in crime. For example, the current research was
unable to account for variations in the characterizations of the
displaced populations across cities. Houston, for example, received
one of the largest, initiative waves of displaced persons. It was
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possible those individuals were among the most disadvantaged and
destitute compared to additional waves moved around in the
following weeks. This was a complicated set of issues that the current
research could not control for.
This study also did not account for the role of Katrina survivors in any
apparent increases in crime. Popular opinion had largely cast survivors in
the role of perpetrators; increases in crime had been caused by an inﬂux
of criminogenic persons who brought their “criminal ways” to host
communities. While there might be anecdotal evidence of this, it was not
possible to glean such ﬁndings from the current analysis. The analysis
relied on ofﬁcially reported crime that traditionally does not collect data
on the residency status (native resident or in the current context,
“evacuee”) of victims or offenders. It was possible that the small but
notable crime increases were as reﬂective of victimization of evacuees as
they were of offending. Thus, policymakers should be cautious about how
they assign meaning to these sorts of changes in crime.
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7. The pre-intervention periods included weeks starting December 29, 2003
(starting ﬁrst full week in January 2004) through August 29, 2005; the postintervention period included weeks starting September 5, 2005 through September
25, 2006.
8. Crime rates were included to permit between-city comparison of crime levels
before and after Katrina. Readers should note that their inclusion in the current
instance was somewhat problematic since exact population ﬁgures after the arrival of
Katrina survivors were questionable.
9. The process for estimating ARIMA parameters is nonspeciﬁc to some degree, a
reality that has led some to characterize it more as “art” than science. The process
involves “eyeing” autocorrelgrams (graphs of autocorrelation error terms) that
visually depict error terms. Autocorrelgrams are subsequently compared to model
graphs that are representative of estimated models. The estimated models are
subsequently run and the error terms modeled, a process that will eventually yield
what is eventually characterized as the best model” by analysts. The nonspeciﬁc nature
of these estimates can result in different estimates by different analysts for the same
data series. See Kleck (1997) for a critique of this form of data modeling.
10. Lower order models are the most common in social science research
(McDowall et al., 1980, p. 28).
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Notes
1. Tracking where members of the diaspora went over time has proven a challenge
due to the absence of a uniﬁed data system tracking the number and location of
displaced individuals. While some of the diaspora was easier to track because of their
dependence on government assistance, others ﬁnanced their own relocation and may
not appear in government data. The migration of the diaspora over time further
complicates estimations of its size and distribution. Many affected individuals
relocated more than once, perhaps to an initial receiving community, then to a
second community to stay with relatives, and then back to their home community.
While many residents returned to their original community (some quickly, others over
long periods of time), a large number have permanently left the affected zone. The city
of Houston estimated approximately 150,000 individuals relocated to Houston and
stayed well into 2006 (Bustillo, 2006; O'Hare, 2007), representing a population
increase of around 7.5 percent. San Antonio received a smaller number of displaced
individuals (“Storm and Crisis,” 2005), with most staying a short period of time before
relocating. Phoenix received a small number of displaced individuals and families
(“Storm and Crisis,” 2005).
2. See http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5440a3.htm.
3. Anything approximating ﬁrm data on the destinations and length of stays for
Katrina-related displaced persons was nearly impossible to access. Dr. Rick Weil
(personal communication, 2006), a sociologist at Louisiana State University who had
studied the impacts of Katrina on the broader community context of New Orleans,
indicated there was no national data on this question.
4. There was a strong relationship level of pre-Katrina preparation and economic
disadvantage. Powell, Jeffries, Newhart, and Stiens (2006, pp. 64-65) describe New
Orleans’ pre-Katrina evacuation plan as a “middle-class oriented evacuation plan” that
was based on individuals leaving in their own cars. The fact that many of New Orleans
most disadvantaged citizens did not own cars appeared to have “escaped” planners
(see also Drabek, 2005, 2007; Gladwin & Peacock, 1997; Perry, 1987).
5. Disaster scholars long have identiﬁed looting behavior in the aftermath of
disasters as a speciﬁc area of inquiry (see Auf der Heide, 2004; Quarantelli & Dynes,
1970). These scholars have noted that extensive looting is quite rare following
disasters. Auf der Heide (2004), for example, argues that even apparent “looting” often
times is nothing more than the lawful salvaging of disaster victims’ own property.
When traditional looting does occur, Auf der Heide (2004) notes that it is more likely
than not perpetrated by outsiders rather than residents of the affected area. Looting
and other forms of antisocial behavior do sometimes occur following disasters, but
more commonly riots. When such behavior does occur, Quarantelli and Dynes (1970)
suggest it is better viewed as a form of “group protest” that looters may or may not be
conscious about and less about individual greed.
6. It should be noted that the crime rates computed above were based on U.S.
Census Bureau 2004 population estimates (http://www.census.gov/popest/cities/subest2004-4.html). It could be argued that the current analysis should continually adjust
the population base rate to account for the population increases and decreases in the
study locations pursuant to Katrina-related displacement. As discussed earlier, the
Katrina-related population shifts increased quite dramatically in the immediate
aftermath of the tragedy and eventually decreased over the coming months. The
week-to-week population data that would be necessary to compute such discrete
crime rate trends were not available.
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